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ture of the European Union (EU or the Union)' rests upon an evolving
constitutional charter arising from the various Treaties 2 and decisions of
the European Court of Justice (EC). 3 Scholarship on the European Union
has wrestled with whether to characterize the political and legal structure
of the EU either as a constitutional entity akin (but not equivalent) to a
federal state4 or as an international organization. 5 Both theoretical models
inadequately account for the political and legal framework of the EU. 6
These characterizations fail because the current network of European laws
1. Since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSA), the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European (Eco-
nomic) Community have collectively become the "European Union." The Court of
Justice of the European Communities [hereinafter the ECJ or Court] is the supreme judi-
cial organ of the EU. Although the Maastricht Treaty formally changed the name of the
European Community (EC) to the European Union, the Court ofJustice of the European
Communities does not have jurisdiction over the entire area of European Union activi-
ties. Hence, the law settled by the European Court of Justice is technically European
Community law rather than European Union law. See TRATv ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb.
7, 1992, Belg.-Den.-F.RG.-Greece-Spain-Fr.-Ir.-Italy-Lux.-Neth.-Port.-U.K., [1992] OJ.
C224/1 [hereinafter TEU or MAASTRICHT TREATY]. Nonetheless, the convention has been
to refer to this law as EU law. This Note attempts to use the term EC law when referring
to particular cases settled before the Maastricht Treaty came into force. Otherwise, this
Note uses the terms EU law, EC law, and law of the Communities interchangeably
according to the conventional practice.
2. The three original Treaties forming the European Communities are the TRATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, Belg.-F.R.G.-Fr.-
Italy-Lux.-Neth., in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of EUROPEAN UNION 1-0109 (Neville March Hun-
nings ed., 2001) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITIES, Mar. 25, 1957, Belg.-F.R.G.-Fr.-Italy-Lux.-Neth., in 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN UNION 2-0003 (Neville March Hunnings ed., 2001) [hereinafter
EURATOM TREATY], and the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
Mar. 25, 1957, Belg.-F.R.G.-Fr.-Italy-Lux.-Neth., in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN UNION
3-0009 (Neville March Hunnings ed., 2001) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The other Trea-
ties include the TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, Belg.-F.R.G.-Fr.-Italy-Lux.-Neth., [1967] J.O. 152/
2, [hereinafter MERGER TREATY], the SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 17, 1986 & Feb. 28,
1986, Belg.-Den.-F.1RG.-Greece-Spain-Fr.-Ir.-Italy-Lux.-Neth.-Port.-U.K., [1987] OJ, L169
[hereinafter SEA]; the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, TEU, and the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM,
Oct. 2, 1997, Belg.-Den.-F.R.G.-Greece-Spain-Fr.-Ir.-Italy-Lux.-Neth.-Aus.-Port.-Fin.-Swed.-
U.K., [1997] OJ. C340/1.
3. See Alan Dashwood, States in the European Union, 23 EUR. L. REy. 201, 201-204
(1998).
4. See DIARMUID RoSSA PHELAN, REVOLT OR REVOLUTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUND-
ARIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 160-161 (1997); see also INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw]; J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:
"Do THE NEw CLOTHES HAvE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
268 (1999). Professor Weiler points out the problem with characterizing the Union:
"[T]he very language of modern democracy, its grammar, syntax and vocabulary,
revolve around the state, the nation and the people-its demos. The Union, it is generally
accepted, is not a state." Id. at 268.
5. See WEILER, supra note 4, at 268-69.
6. See id. at 268-285 (surveying intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and
infranationalism as candidates for classifying the political and economic structure of the
European Union).
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lacks the legitimacy of a coherent, democratic formal framework.7 Despite
its precarious structure, the EU has functioned relatively well under this
"neoconstitutionalism," 8 the organic, functional development of a constitu-
tional framework from the various European Treaties-largely due to the
foresight, flexibility and wisdom of the ECJ. 9 Significantly deepening inte-
gration of the EU's authority further into monetary and political matters
would require the EU to adopt a formal Constitution demarcating author-
ity above and below the individual Member States. 10 The adoption of such
a formal Constitution would put to rest concerns over the legitimacy of the
European Union.11
In Section I, this Note examines the status of the neoconstitutionalism
that has come to dominate the legal structure of the EU. In the past,
neoconstitutionalism has largely provided an adequate legal and political
system for the Union. As long as the EU operates as an intergovernmental
organization, the current level of neoconstitutionalism as formulated by
the ECJ's interpretation of the Treaties may prove sufficient. However,
movement to a more politically and economically integrated Union
requires a formal Constitution setting out the distribution of political and
economic authority between the separate Member States and the EU insti-
tutions. This Note advocates that the European Union must adopt such a
formal constitution that clearly delineates the respective competences of
the EU and its constituent Members States. In Section II, this Note
presents the background for understanding "neofunctionalism," discussing
its major components. Section II also reviews three influential German
cases, Solange I, Solange II and Solange III, and their impact on the recep-
tion of the doctrine of supremacy of EC law in Germany. These cases illus-
trate the difficulties inherent in neoconstitutionalism. In Section III, this
Note examines the deficiencies of neofunctionalism as outlined in Section
II. Specifically, Section III criticizes neofunctionalism's derivative charac-
ter and lack of independent authority, or Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Against
these concerns, Section III evaluates the challenges posed to neoconstitu-
tionalism by the German cases discussed in Section II. Finally, this Note
concludes with comments on the adoption of a formal Constitution for the
European Union.
7. See Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis
of Possible Foundations, 37 HARv. INT'L LJ. 389 (1996).
8. This Note uses the term "neoconstitutionalism" to refer to the evolving constitu-
tional structure from the interpretation of European Union law by the European Court
of Justice.
9. See G.F. MANCINI, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 8-
9 (2000).
10. See Quentin Peel, Berlin Plays a Beguiling Tune, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at 23
(arguing that the EU "needs some sort of constitutional treaty, clear and concise, to spell
out the powers and responsibilities of the different actors, nation states, regions and
European institutions, and the relationship between those institutions").
11. See Our Constitution for Europe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 17.
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I. Background
The process of European integration has transformed the constitutional
framework of Europe. 12 Following World War II, Germany, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg began laying the framework
for European polity with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community, 13 the European Atomic Energy Community, 14 and the Euro-
pean Economic Community. 15 In the decades that followed, the Member
States transferred increasing elements of their sovereignty to the European
institutions, as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all joined the evolving European
order. Although conceived as international organizations, the EU institu-
tions have pruned and fertilized their competencies in an attempt to consti-
tutionalize the anatomy of the European Union. 16 Through this process,
the EU has emerged deceptively closer to a federal state in appearance. 17
However, the collection of international treaties forming the EU lack the
political legitimacy to form a constitution fit for governing a federal state.' 8
Nonetheless, the ECJ has embarked upon a journey into the realms of
neoconstitutionalism' 9-a notion alluded to in several remarkable stud-
ies20 but never adequately explained. Specifically, the leading scholarship
in this area has largely papered over the inconsistencies and disregarded
the actual problems of casually christening this new form of governance as
"constitutional."
A. The Emergence of Neoconstitutionalism
In interpreting EC law, the ECJ assumes that the "EEC-Treaty, albeit con-
cluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes
12. See ELiES STEYGER, EUROPE AND ITS MEMBERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (1995);
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (2d ed. 1988).
13. ECSC TREATY.
14. EURATOM TREATY.
15. EEC TREATY. The other Treaties include the MERGER TREATY, the SEA, the TEU,
and the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM.
16. See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON
MKr. L. REv. 595 (1989).
17. See Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981). This portrayal of the evolving European constitutionalism has
been widely acknowledged by many scholars as one of the earliest works to character-
ized the European Court ofJustice as the architect of a "federal-style constitutionalism."
Id.
18. See Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the
European Union, 21 FoRDuHm INT'L LJ. 746 (1998).
19. SeeJ.H.H. Weiler, European Neo-onstitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the
European Constitutional Order, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 105 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996).
20. See first and foremost the contributions by Professor Weiler, many of which have
been collected in WEILER, supra note 4. See also GEMEINSAMES VERFASSUNGSRECHT IN DER
EUROPAISCHEN UNION (Peter-Christian Mfiller-Graff and Eibe Reidel eds., 1998); THE
EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE EUROPEAN COURTS].
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the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law."21 In
the early 1960s, the Court established the foundation for neoconstitution-
alism that has come to characterize the Communities by establishing the
concept of supremacy of Community law its landmark 1964 case Costa v.
ENEL.2 2 The doctrine is conspicuously absent from the various Treaties of
the European Communities although the European Court of Justice has
vigorously defended the concept since its inception. The Member States
did not welcome the concept. 23 Indeed a number of Member States balked
several decades before recognizing the concept, 24 and until this day, the
Member States have never drafted the doctrine into any of the Treaties.2 5
Nonetheless, the legal academic community has embraced the idea of the
Court of Justice as a constitution-maker. 2 6
Beginning with the establishment of the principles of direct effect and
supremacy, 27 the EU institutions have created a comprehensive legal sys-
tem for the successful performance of EC law.2 8 A purely descriptive
model of European law might assume that the Treaties fulfill "the same
functions as the constitution of a federal state."29 Clearly, such a descrip-
tion of the constitutional character that the Court has embraced is useful in
understanding the Court's role in the integration process; however, it falls
short of appreciating the narrow base of legitimacy upon which the consti-
21. Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area [ECJ], 269 (holding that the
various Treaties form the constitution of the EU).
22. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (1964) (holding that
"[bly creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own
personality and its legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law
which binds both their nationals and themselves.").
23. See HARTLEY, supra note 12, at 219-45 (providing a summary of problems relating
to the acceptance of the supremacy of EC law by the Member States).
24. See THE EUROPEAN COURTS, supra note 20.
25. HARTLEY, supra note 12.
26. Professor Weiler and Professor Haltern argue that such was the impact of Eric
Stein's seminal article on European legal scholarship that the ECJ was no longer even
considered an area within international law. J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The
Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L LJ.
411,421-422 (1996); see also Donal Barrington, The Emergence of a Constitutional Court,
in HumAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSCH, 251
(James O'Reilly ed., 1992); Ole Due, A Constitutional Court for the European Communities,
in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
FOR THE HON. MR. Jus-ncE T. F. O'HIGGINS 3 (Deidre Curtin & David O'Keeffe eds.,
1992); Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 THE AM.J.
Coip. L. 205 (1990); J. Rinze, The Role of the European Court of Justice as a Federal
Constitutional Court, PUB. L. 426 (1993).
27. Mancini, supra note 16, at 596-602. The ECJ formulated the concept of direct
effect, or the immediate enforceability of Treaty provisions by individuals in Member
State courts, in Van Gend en Loos. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (1963). The ECJ recognized the
supremacy of Community law over national in the EC's area of competencies in Costa v.
ENEL. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (1964).
28. Due, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Id.
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tution rests.30
Rather than providing a sound theoretical explanation, the fallacy of
assuming that the EU has a constitution akin to that of the United States or
Germany merely muddles the problems facing the EU. 3 1 At first blush,
neoconstitutionalism may appear adequate as a constitutional model for
the European Union (as the functionalists 32 and neofunctionalists3 3 have
argued). Such an approach, however, ignores problems of legitimacy, sov-
ereignty and the lack of a demos.3 4 On the other hand, dismissing the EU
as an international organization is an oversimplification. 3 5 The following
Section illustrates that the EU's present neoconstitutionalism lacks a defi-
nite form and thus is incapable of creating increased political integration in
Europe.
B. The Components of Neoconstitutionalism
Neoconstitutionalism rests upon three major assumptions. 3 6 First,
neoconstitutionalism does not conform to traditional international law.
Second, the EU suffers from structural deficiencies. Third, the EU has no
demos. The following sections address each of these concerns.
1. The European Treaties Lack the Form of Traditional Constitutional Law
The Treaties do not conform to traditional constitutional law.37 Consider-
ing the Treaties as a constitution is problematic as the Member States
drafted them for establishing international organizations, and they there-
30. See Philip Allott, The Crisis of European Constitutionalism: Reflections on the
Revolution in Europe, 34 COMMON MKir. L. REV. 439, 476-490 (1997).
31. See id.
32. For a discussion on Federalism, see DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM:
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(1943).
33. For further details on neofunctionalism, see LEON N. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1963).
34. The concept of a demos is fundamental to the constitutional foundation of the
European Union. Demos essentially refers to a "people" (or in the German Volk). "The
People are important and too little acknowledged.... Political constitutions make cer-
tain crucial presuppositions about the sociological composition of the polity. They pre-
suppose, if not exactly social homogeneity across the board, at least a certain
homogeneity in the sorts of central principles which are internalized by all the major
groups within the polity." Robert E. Goodin, Designing Constitutions: The Political Consti-
tution of a Mixed Commonwealth, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN
AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 223, 224 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds.,
1996).
35. See Weiler, supra note 19, at 108.
36. Wolf Sauter also identifies three particular components of the neonconstitu-
tional approach: (1) the European Treaties do not form a constitution in the same man-
ner as a nation state; (2) the constitution of the EU consists of both the text of the
Treaties and the ECJ's interpretation of the Treaties; and (3) the Treaties and the ECJ's
decisions leave many gaps in the EU's constitution to be filled in through a dynamic
development of European law. See Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the Euro-
pean Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 27, 30 (1998).
37. For a full discussion on the difference between Treaty law and constitutional
law, see Theodor Schilling, Treaty and Constitution: A Comparative Analysis of and Uneasy
Relationship, 3 MAsTRICI-TJ. EUR. & COMP. L. 47 (1996).
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fore lack independent constitutional authority. 38 A comparison to the
Constitution of the United States illustrates the constitutional deficiencies
in the European Treaties. 39 The lack of a clear statement of the primacy of
European law in the Treaties 4° underlies the complexity of European
neoconstitutionalism. Unlike a traditional constitution, European neocon-
stitutionalism lacks the essential ingredients necessary for the formation of
a federal state.41 Therefore, the Communities suffer initially from a lack of
democratic legitimacy,42 and as a result, are vulnerable to assaults upon
their authority.43 Article VI, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution establishes
the supremacy of federal laws (in the areas of federal competencies) over
state laws.44 However, the various Treaties that form the European Com-
munities lack a clear statement granting supreme constitutional authority
to the European institutions.45
Moreover, while the implementation of the Treaties forming the Euro-
pean Communities depended upon the ratification by the "Member
38. See Schilling, supra note 7.
39. Studies in comparative federalism have compared the government of the Euro-
pean Communities to that of the United States. See, e.g., INTEGRATION THROUGH L.AW,
supra note 4.
40. The willingness of the Member States to comply with the decisions of a suprana-
tional court has inspired many ingenious research projects, of which the debates
between the neorationalists and the neofunctionalists deserve particular mention. See
Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the
European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITU-
TIONS, AND POLITCAL CHANGE 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993);
Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Com-
munity's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533 (1992); Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of
Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT'L ORG. 171 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett et al.,
The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the Euro-
pean Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, New Directions in
Legal Research on the European Community, 31 J. COMMON MK-r. STUD. 391 (1993); Anne-
Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integra-
tion, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in
the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Walter Mattli & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG.177 (1998).
41. See Allott, supra note 30, at 487 (arguing that "[t]he democratic legitimating of
constitutional forms is not achieved by formalistic manipulation of intricate sub-sys-
tems . . [but] must be an interiorization in the consciousness of the people and the
peoples of Europe of the necessity of new social forms of European society").
42. For an excellent study which addresses the democratic deficit in the context of
EC law, see G. Federico Mancini and David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European
Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REv. 175 (1994).
43. SeeJ.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE UJ. 2403, 2464 (1991)
(summarizing the problem of compliance by the Member States).
44. The United States Constitution, Article 6, Section 2 reads: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CoNs-r. art. VI, § 2.
45. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 102-03
(1995). According to Professor Weatherill, the European Court implied supremacy from
the Treaty's objectives, even without explicit statement of supremacy. Id.
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States"4 6 or "High Contracting Parties"4 7 in a similar manner to the Ameri-
can Constitution's contingence upon its ratification by state "conven-
tions, ' 4 8 the ratifications of the European Treaties were conditional upon
the "constitutional requirements" 49 of the Member States. In contrast, the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution was conditional upon no other constit-
uent.5 0 Therefore, the enactment of the European Treaties required the
approval of the constituent Member States of the Community according to
their own constitutions,5 1 while the establishment of the U.S. Constitution
involved the elevation of the document as the supreme law, binding all
those states that ratified it for this purpose.5 2 Thus, while the authority of
the U.S. Constitution is explicit and inherent in the document itself,5 3 the
authority of the Treaties that form the European Communities is derivative,
lacking clear expression in any of the documents. 5 4
2. The European Treaties Lack the Authority of Traditional Constitutional
Law
The EU lacks the authority of a federal state.55 The Treaties do lay the
foundation for this community of states, but they do not form a constitu-
tion.5 6 For a constitution to be accepted as a source of law, "it must have
been enacted or approved or promulgated by a body recognized as compe-
tent to make law."5 7 Possessing sovereignty according to their respective
constitutions,5 8 the Member States ceded only certain competencies to the
institutions of the European Union.5 9 Thus, they retain the constitutional
authority within the EU.6 0 The determining factor is that the European
46. See, e.g., ECSC TREATY.
47. See, e.g., EEC TREATY art. 247; EURATOM TREATY art. 224; TEU art. R, § 1.
48. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
49. See ECSC TREATY art. 99; EEC TRATY art. 247; EURATOM TREATY art. 224; TEU
art. R., § 1.
50. See U.S. CONSTr. art. VII.
51. See EEC TREATY; EURATOM TREATY; TEU.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
53. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HI- v. L. R-v. 149, 151-153 (1928).
54. Nicholas Emiliou, Opening Pandora's Box: The Legal Basis of Community Measures
Before the Court of Justice, 19 EuR. L. REv. 488, 488 (1994) ("The Communities have only
the powers assigned to them by the Treaties, while all residual powers are left with the
Member States.").
55. Allott, supra note 30.
56. The EEC Treaty, for example stated, "[b]y this Treaty, the High Contracting Par-
ties establish among themselves a European Community." EEC Treaty art. 1. The
Euratom Treaty contains similar language. EuRAToM TREATY.
57. K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSwT1rnONs 52 (2d ed. 1966).
58. See generally JEAN BODIN, Six BooKs OF THE COMMONWEALTH, bk. 1, ch. 8 (M. J.
Tooley trans. & abr. MacMillan & Co., 1955) (1576) (explaining the concept of national
sovereignty).
59. See Daniela Obradovic, Community Law and the Doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty,
1 LEGAL IssuEs EuR. INTEGRATION 1 (1993). Obrdovic argues that "the Community holds
not absolutely open-ended but specific powers which can be found throughout the EEC
Treaty." Id. at 11.
60. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 23 (F.R.G.) (providing that sover-
eign powers can only be transferred to the European Union at the approval of the
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Treaties lack the authority of a constitution, and the Member States deter-
mine the development of European integration. 61
To examine these issues further, it is necessary to distinguish between
a community established through a treaty and a state founded upon a con-
stitution.62 A community may have the character of a state when a treaty
confers administrative powers regulating foreign relations and "other func-
tions of the contracting states" on an organ of the community created by
the contracting states, and a constitution is "stipulated by that treaty."6 3
Hans Kelsen further explains:
By concluding such a treaty and submitting to the federal constitution, the
contracting states lose their character as states in the sense of international
law. They become so-called component states of the federal state.... The
centralization in the field of foreign affairs may not be complete; the compo-
nent states may have some competence left in this respect, for instance, the
power to conclude treaties with third states in certain limited fields ....
[However] the component states have this competence [only] in accordance
with the Federal constitution .... 64
In the EU, however, the Member States have retained ultimate political
authority, and thus the EU possesses only derivative authority. 65 Instead,
the European Communities are creatures of treaty-law.6 6 Without an inde-
pendent source of democratic legitimacy, the very existence of the Commu-
nities is dependent upon the Treaties drafted by the Member States. 6 7 An
independent source of legitimacy-specifically a constitution clearly set-
ting out the competencies and authority of the EU-is preferable to the
derivative source of the EU's legitimacy and unsettled doctrine of
supremacy of European law.
3. The Communities Lack a Demos
Political theory holds that a democracy must have a demos, or a people
bound together by culture, language or other factors which make them rec-
Bundesrat). The Bundestag is the lower chamber of the German Parliament, and the
Bundesrat is the upper chamber.
61. Meinhard Hilf, DerJustizkonflikt um EG-Richtlinien: Gel6st, 23 EUROPARECHT 1, 9-
10 (1988).
62. See Schilling, supra note 37 (discussing differences between single act and treaty-
constitutions).
63. HANs KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (Robert W. Tucker ed. &
rev., 2d ed. 1966) (1952).
64. Id.
65. See Rinze, supra note 26, at 436.
66. See Schilling, supra note 7; cf. David Hine, Constitutional Reform and Treaty
Reform in Europe, in FROM THE NATION STATE TO EUROPE? EssAYs IN HONOUR OF JACK
HAYWARD 118 (Anand Menon & Vincent Wright eds., 2001) (explaining that "in a
strictly legal sense, the distinction between a treaty and a constitution is a fundamental
one, and... [ilf [the European Union's] founding treaties are deemed to be traditional
multilateral treaties in international law, squarely in the tradition of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, then it follows that they do not enjoy the status of a 'higher
law' or a constitution . . ").
67. See Josef Isensee, Integrationsziel Europastaat?, in FESTSCHRiFr FOR ULRICH
EVERLING, 567 (Ole Due et al. eds., 1995).
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ognizable as a cohesive group.68 Although the Maastricht Treaty estab-
lishes the concept of European citizenship,69 codifying a concept of
"citizenship" into the Treaties has not led to a European demos.70 At best,
the EU has a "thin identity,"71 because "a sense of European identity and
loyalty is embryonic at best among the European electorate."72 Although a
European demos may emerge from the peoples of Europe, 73 the current
absence of a legitimating constituency for the EU requires clarification of
the political and legal authority of the Member States and the EU. 74 A
formal Constitution that clearly outlines the legal and political boundaries
encapsulating such a developing demos provides a far superior governance
than neoconstitutionalism with its ad hoc approach to integration. 75
C. The Doctrine of Supremacy and German Resistance
As the largest Member State, Germany exemplifies challenges the EU's
legitimacy faces. In particular, the German conditional recognition of the
doctrine of supremacy of European law illustrates the deficiencies of
neoconstitutionalism. 76 The two most important German cases dealing
with the supremacy of European law are Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft,77 commonly known in Germany as Solange I ("so long as"), and
WfInsche Handelsgesellschaft,78 or Solange II. More recently, Solange III,79 a
68. See Weiler, supra note 19.
69. For examinations on European citizenship, see SioaRA O'LEaRY, THE EVOLVING
CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP: FROM FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZEN-
SHIP (1996); EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE (Massimo La Torre ed.,
1998).
70. See Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics
of Participation: Citizenship and the Future of the European Union, 27 MILLENNIUM 447
(1998).
71. DAVID BEETHAM & CHRISTOPHER LORD, LEGITIMACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 43
(1998).
72. Id. at 29.
73. See WEILER, supra note 4, at 324-357.
74. See Johan P. Olsen, How, then, does one get there? An Institutionalist Response to
Herr Fischer's Vision of a European Federation, in WHAT KIND OF CONSTITUTION FOR WHAT
KIND OF POLITY? 163, 164 (ChristianJoerges et al. eds., 2000). According to Olsen, "Bus-
iness as usual will not do." Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
75. Cf. id. at 165-167.
76. For a discussion of German conditional acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy
and the challenges this poses to the legitimacy of the European Union, see Mark Killian
Brewer, Towards a Rational Choice Analysis of the Court ofJustice of the European Com-
munities with an Examination of the Doctrine of Supremacy of European Community
Law and Its Acceptance by the United Kingdom and Germany (1998) (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of St. Andrews 1998) (on file with the University of St. Andrews
Library).
77. See Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
For the case decided by the ECJ, which preceded this decision by the Bundesverfassung-
sgericht, see Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratss-
telie fir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (1970).
78. See Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE 1987) (F.R.G.). For the ECJ case, which preceded this decision
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, see Case 126/81, Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Ger-
many, 1982 E.C.R. 1479 (1982).
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case before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or German Federal Constitutional
Court, has further clarified the standing of EC law vis-A-vis the Grundge-
setz, the German Constitution. 0 In the first case, the Bundesverfassung-
sgericht ruled that as long as Community law did not provide as stringent
protection for human rights as the Grundgesetz, German courts were to
refer questions of constitutionality to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which
could ignore such EC law.8 1 The German Court adopted this position
because EC law is considered derivative law by the German Constitutional
Court and thus must conform to the Grundgesetz.8 2 The second case rep-
resented a change of attitude by the Bundgesverfassungsgericht since it
found that the European Communities vis-a-vis the Grundgesetz sufficiently
guaranteed the protection of human rights.8 3 Following an overview of the
German legal system, these cases will be examined more fully in turn.
D. The German Legal Framework
Germany's legal system is based on a written constitution, the Grundgesetz,
or "Basic Law." Drafted in the aftermath of World War II, it nevertheless
owes much to former German legal culture, although it was also pro-
foundly influenced by the legal precepts of the occupying Allied powers,
especially the United States. Typical of the constitutions of most liberal
democracies, the Grundgesetz focuses on human rights, provides for a
divided system of government, establishes a constitutional court with the
power of judicial review, and decrees the Grundgesetz as "the supreme law
of the land."84 Although the Grundgesetz is often regarded as being heavily
influenced by American ideas, it bears a close resemblance in parts to the
Frankfurter Constitution of 1849 and the Weimar Republican Constitu-
tion. However, rather than containing "statements of political ideals and
guidelines to political action," as was characteristic of earlier German con-
stitutions, the Grundgesetz "is a law of superior force and obligation and is
directly enforceable as law" in the court system headed by the
79. See Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner et al. v. The European
Union Treaty, I C.M.L.R. 57 (1994 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
80. See Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The Ger-
man Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 CoLuM. J. EuR. L. 229
(1997). The terms Bundesverfassungsgericht and German Constitutional Court will be
used interchangeably throughout this Note, as will the terms Grundgesetz and German
Constitution.
81. See HARTL-Y, supra note 12, at 223-224.
82. See Nigel G. Foster, The German Constitution and E.C. Membership, PUB. L. 392
(1994).
83. See J.A. Frowein, National Courts: Solange 11 (BVerfGE 73, 339). Constitutional
Complaint Firma W., 25 COMMON MEr. L. RFv. 201 (1988). Professor Frowein notes, "By
this decision the German Constitutional Court... accepted that the safeguards existing
against possible interference with fundamental rights in European Community law,
especially by virtue of the case law of the European Court of Justice, are sufficiently
developed to be fully recognized by German Constitutional Law." Id. at 201.
84. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE Of THE FEDERAL REPuB-
Lic oF GERMANY 31 (2d ed., rev. 1997).
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Bundesverfassungsgericht, or Federal Constitutional Court.85 Through the
Grundgesetz, "legalism was reintroduced into the German political sys-
tem."'86 The result was a "reliance on authoritative judicial decisions to
resolve political disputes rather than a preference for purely political meth-
ods."87 The judiciary was thus accorded a significant share of the govern-
ment's power.
Germany is constitutionally bound to work towards European integra-
tion. Specifically, in an attempt to prevent another war by anchoring Ger-
many in a pan-European institutional framework, the drafters of the
Grundgesetz expressed the aspiration for a "united Europe" in the docu-
ment's Preamble.88 West Germany89 joined the European Communities
based on Article 2490 of the Grundgesetz. However, with the reunification
of Germany in 1990, the Grundgesetz (which was amended for this pur-
pose) became the constitution for the enlarged Federal Republic. 91 At the
same time, the Federal Republic adopted new Article 2392 to the Grundge-
setz, providing the legal basis for Germany's membership in the Communi-
ties. Specifically, this new article allows, upon consent of the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat, sovereign powers to be ceded to the European Commu-
nities. Moreover, both the Parliament and Federal Council must approve
any modification to the Treaties, along with the approval of the Lander,93
85. Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany: An Assess-
ment After Forty Years, in THE FEDmL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT FORTY 134-135 (Peter H.
Merkl ed., 1989).
86. Gisbert Brinkmann, The West German Federal Constitutional Court: Political Con-
trol Through Judges, PUB. L. 83, 85 (1981).
87. Id.
88. The first sentence of the Preamble of the Grundgesetz expresses this desire: "Im
Bewuptsein seiner Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen, von dem Willen
beseelt ... als gleichberechtigtes Glied in einem vereinten Europa dem Frieden der Welt
zu dienen, hat das Deutsche Volk... kraft seiner verfassungsgebenden Gewalt dieses
Grundgesetz." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] pmbl. (F.R.G.).
89. The former East Germany joined the European Communities when it became
part of the Federal Republic of Germany by the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990.
For details of legal issues involving the reunification of Germany, see Gilbert H. Gornig
and Sven Reckewerth, The Revision of the German Basic Law: Current Perspectives and
Problems in German Constitutional Law, PUB. L. 137 (1997).
90. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 24. (F.R.G.).
91. For further discussion on the challenges of reunification, see C. W. A. Tim-
mermans, German Unification and Community Law, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 437
(1990); Christian Tomuschat, A United Germany Within the European Community, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 415 (1990); and Franziska Tschofen & Christian Hausmaninger,
Legal Aspects of East and West Germany's Relationship with the European Economic Com-
munity After the Collapse of the Berlin Wall, 31 HARv. INT'L LJ. 647 (1990).
92. Basically, Article 23 allows and even calls for Germany to participate in the
development of a united Europe. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 23. (F.R.G.).
93. Loss of competences by the separate Lander has been an important issue in the
German approach to European integration. The new Article 23 was partly intended to
compensate the Lander for lost competences. For a full discussion see Michael
Borchmann, Bundesstaat und Europaische Integration, 112 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN
RECHTs 586 (1987); Konrad Hesse, Bundesstaatsreform und Grenzen der Verfassung-
sanderung, 98 ARCHLY DES OFFENTLICHEN REcHTs 1 (1973); and KLAUS KROGER,
EINFOHRUNG IN DIE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 151-159
(1993).
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which "ensures that a complete parliamentary process is observed" before
a further transfer of sovereign power can occur.94 In this manner, Ger-
many is only able to participate in greater European integration if approved
both on a Lander and Federal level, which greatly enhances the democratic
control of Germany's relations with the Communities.
While the Grundgesetz dearly supports European integration, the
incorporation of EC law has been met with some difficulty, particularly
with regard to the doctrine of supremacy. At its inception, Community law
was grafted onto domestic law according to a dualist approach. Nigel Fos-
ter explains this phenomenon as follows:
The discussion from the German point of view lies essentially with the rela-
tionship of international law, and in particular the membership of the Com-
munity, to the provisions of the Grundgesetz. Traditionally, Germany
adopted a dualist approach to the reception of international law, whereby
some form of transformation or adoption of international law was necessary
in order for it to have any direct applicability in the state. In practical terms
it meant that there had to be a process of incorporation by statute. Once
incorporated, a law would simply rank as with other Gesetze, and if a later
law was in conflict with an earlier law, the latter would prevail.9 5
Approaching European law from such a dualistic legal background,
Germany has essentially regarded the body of EC law as international law.
Hence, the ultimate legitimacy of Community law in terms of German
adherence is based on the Grundgesetz, and not upon the European Trea-
ties. What this means, according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, is that
German acceptance of European Community law is a result of the provi-
sions of German national law and not from an inherent source of authority
flowing from the Communities as assumed by the ECJ. It is this lack of
agreement on the origin of supremacy that is at the heart of the debate.
E. Solange I: Initial German Resistance to Authority of the European
Communities
Solange I arose out of a grievance against the partial forfeiture of a deposit
that the import-export company Internationale Handelsgesellschaft of
Frankfurt am Main had lodged to receive a license for the export of 20,000
metric tons of maize meal.9 6 In conformity to Council Regulation No.
120/67/EEC,97 the license was effective from August 7, 1967 until Decem-
ber 31, 1967, and conditional upon lodging a deposit ensuring that the
amount of meal would, in fact, be exported.98 Since only 11,486.764 met-
ric tons of the meal had been exported during the period granted for the
license, the Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fpr Getreide und Futtermittel held that
part of the deposit (17,026.47 DM) was to be forfeited under Council Regu-
94. NIGEL Fos-R, GERMAN LEGAL SYsTEM & LAws 73 (2d ed. 1996).
95. Id. at 67.
96. Case 11/70, Internationale HandelsgeseUschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratss-
telle ftr Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (1970).
97. Council Regulation 120/67, art. 12, 1967 Oj. SPEc. ED. 33, 38.
98. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (1970).
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lation No. 473/67/EEC. 9 9 They brought the dispute before the Verwaltung-
sgericht (Administrative Court) in Frankfurt am Main, which appealed to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.10 0 Specifically, the Verwaltungsgericht ini-
tially questioned the legality of the deposit and forfeiture guidelines in
Council Regulation No. 120/67/EEC, and subsequently, if the said regula-
tion was found to be legal, inquired if Council Regulation No. 473/67/EEC
was legal since it excluded forfeiture only with respect to force majeure.10 1
The referral to the ECJ stemmed from the Verwaltungsgericht's concern that
the regulations in question failed to respect the fundamental rights laid
down in the Grundgesetz (namely Articles 2 [1] and 14).102
In its decision, the European Court of Justice argued the supremacy of
European law over that of the Member States. 10 3 The ECJ stated:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would
have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law.
The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community
law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of
law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law,
however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in question.
Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either funda-
mental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles
of a national constitutional structure. 10 4
So, "even a violation of the fundamental human rights provisions of a
Member State's constitution could not impair the validity of a Community
provision." 10 5 In its final analysis, the ECJ further approved the system of
deposits and forfeiture. 10 6
Concerning the ECJ's preliminary ruling, the Verwaltungsgericht was
hostile and unsatisfied. 10 7 In particular, the Verwaltungsgericht held that
the Community lacked not only a written bill of rights but also a parlia-
ment with the authority to establish such a guarantee of basic rights. More-
over, the German court "found in the ECJ's approval of what it continued
to regard as the iniquitous deposit system a powerful confirmation of its
deepest suspicions about the 'legal vacuum' of Community law."' 0 8 As a
result of its discontent, the Verwaltungsgericht appealed the case to the
99. See Journal Officiel des Communautds Europeennes, vol. 10, no. 204 (Aug. 24,
1967): 16-20.
100. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (1970).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1127-1128; see also GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 2(1) & 14
(F.RG.).
103. See D. LASOK & PA. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 22-
23 (1987).
104. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1135 (1970).
105. HARTLEY, supra note 12, at 134.
106. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1133-1139 (1970).
107. See BERNARD RUDDEN, BAsic COMMUNITY CASES 67 (1987).
108. Id.
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Bundesverfassungsgericht.10 9 The Bundesverfassungsgericht faced two ques-
tions: (1) whether or not the case was admissible and (2) whether or not
the system of deposits was justified.' 10
First, the Bundesverfassungsgericht examined the relationship between
the constitutional law of Germany and EC law to determine whether the
case was admissible. 1 ' Beyond recognizing that European law is separate
from both national and international law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
agreed that the respective jurisdictions of the ECJ and the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht constitute separate legal domains; therefore, the two courts
cannot legally impinge on the jurisdiction of the other. 1 2 Accordingly, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht argued that:
The binding of the Federal Republic of Germany (and of all member-States)
by the Treaty is not, according to the meaning and spirit of the Treaties, one-
sided, but also binds the Community which they establish to carry out its
part in order to resolve the conflict here assumed, that is, to seek a system
which is compatible with an entrenched precept of the constitutional law of
the Federal Republic of Germany. Invoking such a conflict is therefore not
in itself a violation of the Treaty, but sets in motion inside the European
organs the Treaty mechanism which resolves the conflict on a political
level. 113
Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht plainly held that the ECJ may
only determine questions of law within its own jurisdiction based on the
Treaties; any such expansion could occur only through the acts of the
Member States to grant additional areas of competence to the ECJ. 1 14
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, in contrast to the reasoning of the EQJ,
held that ultimate sovereignty rests in the Grundgesetz, and hence with the
German nation-state. 1 15 Further, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explained:
Article 24 does not actually give authority to transfer sovereign rights, but
opens up the national legal system (within the limitations indicated) in such
a way that the Federal Republic of Germany's exclusive claim to rule is taken
back in the sphere of validity of the Constitution and room is given, within
the State's sphere of rule, to the direct effect and applicability of law from
another source.1 16
The German Federal Court was concerned that the European legal sys-
tem did not sufficiently protect the basic rights outlined in the Grundgesetz
because the European Parliament (at that time) was not directly elected and
the Communities lacked a bill of rights, just as the Verwaltungsgericht had
109. Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
110. See id.; HATLEY, supra note 12, at 224.
111. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 547-549.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 550.
114. See id. at 549, 551-52.
115. See id. at 551-552.
116. Id. at 550.
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argued.11 7
The Bundesverfassungsgericht argued that:
In accordance with the Treaty rules on jurisdiction, the European Court of
Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the legal validity of the norms of Commu-
nity law (including the unwritten norms of Community law which it consid-
ers exist) and on their construction. It does not, however, decide incidental
questions of national law of the Federal Republic of Germany (or in any
other member-State) with binding force for this State. Statements in the rea-
soning of its judgments that a particular aspect of a Community norm
accords or is compatible in its substance with a constitutional rule of
national law-here, with a guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitu-
tion-constitute non-binding obiter dicta.118
While recognizing that the European Court did enjoy supremacy in its
particular area of jurisdiction, the Bundesverfassungsgericht dearly condi-
tioned the EC's authority upon respect for the Grundgesetz." 9 Moreover,
the German Federal Court stressed that if the ECJ failed to appreciate the
limits to its jurisdiction and issued ultra vires decisions, these decisions
would not bind the Member States. 120 This declaration constituted a
direct challenge to the authority of the ECJ. The Bundesverfassungsgericht
further held that "only the Bundesverfassungsgericht is entitled, within the
framework of the powers granted to it in the Constitution, to protect the
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution. No other court can
deprive it of this duty imposed by constitutional law."'12 1 Finally, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht justified its authority to hear the case:
[A] Community regulation.., implemented by an administrative authority
of the Federal Republic of Germany or dealt with by a court in the Federal
Republic of Germany ... is an exercise of German State power; and, in this
process, the administrative authority and courts are also bound to the con-
stitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 12 2
Based on these issues, the Bundesverfassungsgericht found that "so
long as" the European legal system did not protect basic rights guaranteed
by the Grundgesetz, Community provisions were subject to review by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht.123 In so doing, Germany essentially balked at
the doctrine of supremacy in EC law and instead, asserted the primacy of
the Grundgesetz.
In the substance of the case, the Bundesverfassungsgericht found "[t]he
challenged rule of Community law in the interpretation given by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice does not conflict with a guarantee of fundamental
rights in the Constitution, neither with Article 12 nor with Article 2 (1) of
117. SeeJuliane Kokott, German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration
II, 2 EuR. PuB. L. 413, 423-24 (1996).
118. Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle fdr Getreide und Futtermittel, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 551 (1974) (F.R.G).
119. See id. at 551-552.
120. See id. at 549-550.
121. Id. at 552.
122. Id. at 553.
123. See id. at 554.
2001 The European Union and Legitimacy
the Constitution."124 However, the importance of the case lies in its
impact on the doctrine of supremacy; therefore, this provides a background
for understanding the events of the case.12 5
F. Solange II: German Conditional Acceptance of the Authority of the
European Communities
The response of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange 11126 to the ECJ's
decision in Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaftl27 largely alleviated the threat to
the supremacy of European law.' 2 8 The Bundesverfassungsgericht changed
its position in response to the safeguards for the fundamental rights intro-
duced by the Communities in the time since the Internationale Handel-
sgesellschaft ruling.129 Content that European law protected basic rights at
a level comparable to the Grundgesetz, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated
that it would no longer evaluate the compatibility of EC law to German
law.130 However, the Court carefully framed the decision to reserve the
authority to withdraw its approval of the doctrine of supremacy if the Ger-
man Constitutional Court later found that EC law no longer offered ade-
quate protection of human rights. In so doing, the Bundesverfass-
ungsgericht again made clear that Kompetenz-Kompetenz remained with
Germany. 13 1
In the national case,132 the Bundesverfassungsgericht received a request
to review the ECJ's ruling in Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany133
from a Preliminary Ruling in a case pending in the Bundesverwaltungsge-
richt (or Supreme Administrative Court of Germany). 13 4 In Wfinsche
Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, the ECJ ruled that Council and Commis-
sion legislation regarding the importation of preserved mushrooms from
non-European Union countries was justified.13 5
Upon receipt of the preliminary ruling in Wfinsche Handelsgesell-
124. Id. at 556.
125. See RUDDEN, supra note 107, at 68; Case 181/84, The Queen, ex parte E.D. & F.
Man (Sugar) Ltd. v. Intervention Bd. for Agric. Produce (IBAP), 1985 E.C.R. 2889
(1985). In actuality, the ECJ subsequently found that the deposit system for license
export breaches European Law.
126. See Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wiansche Handelsgesellschaft, 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE 1987) (F.R.G.).
127. See Case 126/81, Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, 1982 E.C.R. 1479
(1982).
128. See June 1987: Community Primacy and Fundamental Rights, 12 EUR. L. REv. 161,
161-62 (1987).
129. See Juliane Kokott, Reporting on Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND
NATIONAL COURTS-DocTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CoNTExr,
89-90 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
130. See Hartley, supra note 12, at 224-225.
131. See Frowein, supra note 83, at 201.
132. See Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE 1987) (F.R.G.).
133. See Case 126/81, Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, 1982 E.C.R. 1479
(1982).
134. See Case 7 C 87.78, 1 Dec. 1982 EuR 67, (BVerwGE 1983) (F.R.G.).
135. See Re the Application of W-insche Handelsgesellschaft 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE
1987) (F.R.G.).
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schaft,13 6 Wfinsche protested that the ECJ had breached particular German
constitutional provisions, particularly that of the right to a hearing since-
according to the German company-the ECJ failed to weigh important con-
siderations that Wiinsche had submitted. 137 Moreover, the German com-
pany argued that the Court should suspend the case and refer it to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht or appeal for a new preliminary ruling from the
ECJ. 138 In response, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht dismissed the appeal,
arguing that the grievances by Wfinsche were unfounded. 139 Maintaining
that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht violated procedural and substantial
rights of the Grundgesetz, the German company again appealed the case
with the result that they ultimately brought the matter before the
Bundesverfassungsgericht.140
The German Federal Constitutional Court found that while the appeal
was admissible on constitutional grounds, it was not "well founded," 141
finding that developments in the EC since its decision in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft indicated that basic rights were in fact adequately pro-
tected. 142 Based on the assurance that the Communities adequately pro-
tected human rights, the German Federal Constitutional Court maintained:
In view of those developments it must be held that, so long as the European
Communities, and in particular in the case law of the European Court, gen-
erally ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sov-
ereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially
similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by
the Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential con-
tent of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer
exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Commu-
nity legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or
authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution .... 143
The Bundesverfassungsgericht recognized the ECJ as a "gesetzlicher
Richter (a legal judge)" in the sense that it has the authority to give defini-
tive rulings, enhancing the integrity of the European Court.144 However, as
one commentator has observed:
It is clear that the Federal Constitutional Court did not give up its jurisdic-
tion or come to the conclusion that no such jurisdiction exists. It only states
that it will not exercise the jurisdiction as long as the present conditions as
to the protection of fundamental rights by the European Court of Justice
136. See id.
137. See id. at 238.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 239.
140. Id. at 240.
141. Id. at 250.
142. See id. at 259.
143. Id. at 265.
144. H. Gerald Crossland, Three major decisions given by the Bundesverfassungsgericlt
(Federal Constitutional Court), 19 EUR. L. REv. 202, 203 (1994).
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prevail.145
Germany retained the primacy of the Grundgesetz in defiance of the
reasoning of the ECJ.146 The German Federal Constitutional Court did
accept the doctrine of supremacy in practice.1 4 7 However, its acceptance
was conditional upon the ECJ conforming to the principles of German
national law.148
G. Solange III: Bundesrecht Bricht Europarecht?14 9 : Continued German
Reluctance
The case, brought by four Members of the European Parliament (in the
capacity of private citizens) and a former official of the Commission, chal-
lenged the Maastricht Treaty on constitutional grounds.150 Concerned
about "the erosion of national sovereignty and of the powers of the German
Parliament," the complainants charged that the legislative assent that rati-
fied the Maastricht Treaty for Germany and the constitutional amendments
for this purpose violated the Grundgesetz.15 1 The Bundesverfassungsgericht,
however, ruled that the ratification of Maastricht was compatible with the
Grundgesetz since Germany transferred sovereignty in accordance with
Articles 23 and 24 (Grundgesetz).15 2 While this decision further recog-
nized the doctrine of supremacy of EC law in Germany, it also placed new
restrictions on further integration. 15 3
The decision formally recognized the compatibility of the new Article
23 of the Grundgesetz with the German constitutional order. 15 4 While the
European unity has been a goal of the Grundgesetz as established in the
Preamble, Article 23 not only commits Germany to work towards a united
Europe, but also clarifies the goal's meaning and significance. 15 5 Through
the article, Germany formalized into its own domestic legal order the con-
cept of European law as a separate legal order, which the European Court
had long recognized.1 56 Additionally, Article 23 assigns broad powers to
145. Frowein, supra note 83, at 203.
146. See Meinhard Hulf, Solange II: Wie Lange noch Solange?, 14 EuGRZ 1 (1987)
(arguing that further European integration would be dependent upon joint decision-
making and intensive cooperation between the ECJ and the Bundesverfassungsgericht).
147. See Kokott, supra note 129, at 122.
148. See Crossland, supra note 144, at 204.
149. Bundesrecht bricht Europarecht? may be translated as "Does German Federal
Constitutional law enjoy a primacy over European law?" This is the fundamental
question concerning the relationship between German federal law and European law.
150. See Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner et al. v. The European
Union Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (1994 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
151. Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitu-
tional Restraints for an 'Ever Closer Union,' 31 COMMON Mcr. L. Rev. 235, 238 (1994).
152. Foster, supra note 82, at 392-93.
153. Herdegen, supra note 151, at 239.
154. See Manfred Brunner et al., 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 82-83 (1994 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
155. See Karl-Peter Sommermann, Staatsziel ,Europaische Union": Zur Normativen
Reichweite des Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. I GG n. F., DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 596, 603
(1994).
156. The European Court of Justice introduced such a distinction between traditional
international law and European law as early as 1963, in its Van Gend en Loos decision.
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the separate Lander through the Bundesrat and the government through the
Bundestag to formulate German policy toward the EU.157 Scholars have
made much over this new "cooperation" in the academic literature.158
Although the wording of Article 23 enables the development of a
"European Union," the article is hardly explicit on details,' 5 9 and qualifica-
tions introduced by the Solange III decision obfuscate the exact legal impli-
cations.' 60 Professor Herdegen summarizes the impact of the reasoning in
Solange III:
This concept of "cooperation" amounts to quite a flat (and renewed) denial
of the absolute supremacy of Community law and its supreme judicial
organ .... This message from Karlsruhe will hardly cause unmitigated
enthusiasm in Brussels or Luxembourg. However, the Federal Constitutional
Court's position seems conclusive as long as the pouvoir constituant of Ger-
many has not yet recognized the absolute supremacy of Community law and
as long as the powers of the Constitutional Court are exclusively derived
from the Basic Law. 16 1
Finally, any future expansion of the competences of the Communities
and the European Court, can only occur within the restrictions placed on
such transfers of sovereignty as outlined in Article 23.162 Through Article
23, the Bundestag and the Lander-through the Bundesrat -gained signifi-
cant powers to consult the Federal Government and affect future German
participation in European integration since both the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat must approve the policies for them to be valid as the German
position.163 Solange III again proved that the European Communities
essentially remain an inter-governmental institution in which the Member
States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice. 164
I1. Analysis
A. The Problem of "Constitutionalism Without a Constitution"
By formulating a constitutional framework from the Treaties, the EU relies
on a network of "constitutional practices without any underlying... con-
stitutionalism."165 Although the components of neoconstitutionalism out-
See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expedite Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (1963).
157. See Foster, supra note 82, at 400.
158. Grimm, supra note 80, at 237; Herdegen, supra note 151, at 239.
159. See Udo Di Fabio, Der Neue Art. 23 Des Grundgesetzes: Positivierung vollzogenen
Verfassungswandels oder VerfassungsneuschLipfung? 32 DER STAAT 191, 195 (1993).
160. See Kokott, supra note 117, at 431-435.
161. Herdegen, supra note 151, at 239.
162. See Sommermann, supra note 155, at 604.
163. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 23, §§ 2-6 (F.R.G.).
164. Cf. Kevin D. Makowski, Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional Court's
Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 16 U. PA.J. lN'L Bus. L.
155, 168 (1995) ("[The Court determined that the ultimate goal of the EU was simply
to create a stronger organization of states rather than a federal state or a 'United States
of Europe.'").
165. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 26, at 423. This Note employs the designation
neoconstitutionalism to stress the difference between true constitutionalism and the
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lined in Section II alluded to its inherent deficiencies, this section contains
a review and a more systematic analysis of these major deficiencies as back-
ground to analyzing the German cases. The EU's lack of a constitution
clearly delineating the respective competencies of the Union and the Mem-
ber States has deprived the EU of a basic constitutional form. 166 Borrow-
ing from agency law, the relationship between the EU and the Member
States could be thought of in terms of an agent to its principal.167 Nor-
mally in such an agent-principal relationship, the principal delegates
authority to the agent to perform acts on behalf of the principal. 168 Under
agency law, "[a]n agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what it is rea-
sonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do in the light of
the principal's manifestations and the facts as he knows or should know
them at the time he acts."169 Applying the agency concept to the EU, the
EU institutions must act on behalf of the Member States according to the
Treaties. 170 Unless the Member States clearly delineate the competences of
the institutions in a formal constitution, the institutions of the EU run the
risk of acting beyond the wishes of the Member States.' 7 '
B. Derivative Authority of the Communities and Kompetenz-Kompetenz
The Communities therefore possess simply "derivative autonomy," rather
than "original autonomy."172 While the Treaties and subsequent legal acts
do represent an "assemblage of laws, institutions and customs,"'1 73 this
source of law lacks the authority of the respective national constitutions of
the Member States.174 Professor K.C. Wheare suggests that constitutions
generally "claim to possess the authority not of law only but of supreme
law."'175 First, logic dictates that the constitution must supercede other
laws or it would fail to serve the purpose for which it was created-an
"constitutional" in the context of the European Union. A more appropriate label might
be formulated in German by the designation Staatenbundverfassung, which denotes the
constitution of a union of States.
166. See FRANK VIBERT, EUROPE: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE MILLENIUM vii (1995).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958); see also Mark A. Pollack, The
Engines of Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union, in
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 217, 249 (Wayne Sandholtz &
Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958).
169. Id. § 33.
170. Cf. id. § 7 ("Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the
principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent tohim.").
171. Compare Ulrich Everling, The European Court of Justice and Interpretation of the
Treaty, in THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 52 (1995) ("It is
undisputed that the Community's institutions are only competent to act as far as sover-
eign powers are given to them by the Treaty.") with A.L.I., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 14 (1958) ("A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with
respect to matters entrusted to him.").
172. See Schilling, supra note 7, at 389-390 (emphases added).
173. WHEARE, supra note 57, at 2 (quoting Bolingbroke, ON PAR-IES); CONSTITUmONAL
AND ADMINISTRATVE LAv 4 (A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing eds., 11th ed. 1993).
174. See Emiliou, supra note 54, at 488.
175. WHEARE, supra note 57, at 56.
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authoritative source of law-as is the logic of Marbury v. Madison176 in
U.S. law. Second, the constitution is the result of the actions of one who
has the authority "to make supreme law."17 7 According to Professor
Everling:
Courts in States receive their legitimation from constitutions, from which
their traditional position obtains its justification. The Court of Justice relies
in this regard on Article 164 of the EC Treaty, according to which the Court
is to ensure that "in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law
is observed." It is, however, not bound in the same way as national courts
by a network of institutional relationships, for the constitutional system of
the Community has not yet been secured and in part receives its legitimation
indirectly from the Member States.1
78
A fundamental problem surrounding the doctrine of supremacy of
European law is the discord regarding its source.17 9 While the ECJ regards
supremacy as an intrinsic quality of European law as initially formulated
in Costa v. ENEL,18 0 the Bundesverfassungsgericht has continued to hold
that Community law enjoys primacy over national law in Germany solely
because the Grundgesetz grants such authority;18 1 however, "the ECJ can-
not give judgments which have the effect of extending the Treaty. If so,
they would not be binding in Germany." 18 2 Given that amendment of the
Treaties is largely dependent on the Member States 18 3 and the
Bundesverfassungsgericht occupies the position of guardian of the constitu-
tion in Germany, the "competence to scrutinize the applicability of Com-
munity law, [and] . . . even . .. the actions of the ECJ" hence lies with
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court. 18 4 Moreover, as long as the
Communities have the character of an association of States,185 "there can
176. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Many compare the U.S.
Supreme Court's Marbury v. Madison ruling to the ECJ's in Costa since both clearly
establish the supremacy of the respective courts; however, such a loose comparison fails
to acknowledge the very real differences in the two courts competences: first, the
Supreme Court enjoys the supremacy clause in the Constitution in stark contrast to the
lack of such a statement the European Treaties; second, the Supreme Court serves a
Federal State while the ECJ serves a group of Communities, established under interna-
tional law.
177. WHEARE, supra note 57, at 56-57.
178. See Ulrich Everling, Reflections on the Reasoning in the Judgments of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, in FEsTmIur TL OLE DUE 58 (1994).
179. See Joseph Weiler, Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the
Law Relevant?, 21 J. COMMON Mcr. STUD. 39 (1982); cf. FRANcisco RUBIO LLORENTE, CON-
STITUTIONALISM IN THE "INTEGRATED" STATES OF EUROPE (HARvARD JEAN MONNEr PAPER
SEwREs), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/98/98-5-.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2001).
180. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (1964).
181. See Wulf-Henning Roth, The Application of Community Law in West Germany:
1980-1990, 28 COMMON Mir. L. Rev. 137, 142 (1991).
182. Foster, supra note 82, at 408.
183. See HARTLEY, supra note 12, at 90.
184. Grimm, supra note 80, at 236.
185. See Bruno de Witte, Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal
Tradition, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS & NATIONAL CoURTs: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE
293-301 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) (explaining the emphasis on national
sovereignty following the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty).
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never be a transfer of power to create powers (the Kompetenz-Kompetenz)
and the range of powers transferred can only be within the express and
dear parameters as controlled by the Member States as 'Masters of the
Treaty' (Herren der Vertrdge)."'18 6
The Communities originated from treaties in the style of international
law.18 7 However, the process of integration has seen the Court's decisions
attempt to convert supra-national agreements into a constitutional form.188
The fundamental problem is that without a true constitution, the legiti-
macy of the Communities flows not from the Treaties themselves but from
the Member States' continued respect for them.'8 9 Therefore, the Court is
not wholly independent of the Member States as it possesses no inherent
jurisdiction. 190  The Bundesverfassungsgericht has guaranteed that
Kompetenz-Kompetenz remains with Germany. 19 1  Specifically, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht have concluded that "the Treaty on European
Union does not set up a supranational entity invested with the insignia of
statehood,"'192 and the German Supreme Constitutional Court further per-
ceives the "union" as a Staatenverbund-an association of States-and not
an association of people.' 93 In addition, there have been dear signs that,
at least in the short-term, the evolution of the European Union into an
entity in the manner in "which the United States of America became a
state" will not occur. 194
The European Communities rest upon an inter-governmental struc-
ture,' 9 5 and unless the Member States endow the Communities with con-
stitutional authority, the integrity of the European institutions will depend
precisely upon the willingness of the Member States to cooperate with the
European institutions.19 6 To state this plainly, without transferring
Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the Communities, the Treaties cannot be trans-
formed into a true constitution for Europe.' 9 7 Hence, despite the Court's
186. Foster, supra note 82, at 407.
187. See Stein, supra note 17, at 1-3.
188. See id.
189. See Ulrich Everling, The Court of Justice as a Decisionmaking Authority, 82 MIcH.
L. Ray. 1294, 1306 (1984) ("The Court cannot ignore that in the final analysis the Mem-
ber States sustain the Community as its founders and exercise decisive responsibility
through the Council .... ").
190. See HARLEY, supra note 12, at 56; cf. Anthony Arnull, Does the Court of Justice
Have Inherent Jurisdiction?, 27 COMMON MKr. L. Ray. 683 (1990) (arguing that the ECJ
has expanded its jurisdiction beyond a competence d'attribution).
191. See Kokott, supra note 117, at 434.
192. Herdegen, supra note 151, at 241.
193. Id.
194. Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner et al. v. The European
Union Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R 57, 90 (1994 BVerfGE) (F.R.G.).
195. See Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Lib-
eral Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. COMMON MK-r. STUD. 473, 509 (1993).
196. Cf. P. Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legiti-
macy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 177 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Bflrca eds., 1999).
197. Cf. Herdegen, supra note 151, at 235-36. Herdegen explains the impact of the
Solange III decision on the idea of constitutionalism in the European Union: "The
Court's [Bundesverfassungsgericht] perception of the European Union as a special com-
pound of States falling short of statehood might deal a mild blow to a school of thought
Cornell International Law Journal
consistent inclination to cloak its decisions with the trappings of constitu-
tionalism,198 the body of European law remains something other than a
constitution. 19 9
C. Legitimacy, Constitutions, and the European Union
Legitimacy200 refers to the nature and appropriateness of statutes or other
laws enacted by a legislature or sovereign, or here, the legitimacy of a Euro-
pean governance lacking a formal constitution. Max Weber identifies four
bases of legitimacy: (1) tradition or belief that legitimacy has always
existed; (2) change in attitudes-often emotional-toward espousing a new
model, which frequently comes as prophesy; (3) rational belief in an abso-
lute value of "natural law"; and (4) respect for actions established in a legal
manner.20 1 For a government or institution to be legitimate, one might
consider the particular conditions to be met in the creation and implemen-
tation of law. 20 2 These conditions refer to the manner in which a govern-
ment or institution formulates law, how the institution or government
posits its lawmaking authority, and the manner and degree to which the
constituents support the laws. Professor David McKay points out the legiti-
macy crisis facing the European Union:
[T]he experience of constitution building in other federations suggests that,
in order to avoid legitimization problems, a constitutional settlement eventu-
ally has to [be] reached that clearly defines the limits to central power and
provides the states with guarantees of sovereignty. No such settlement has
thus been concluded in the European Union.20 3
Constitutions generally validate themselves by basing their legitimacy
upon "the people" of a particular state.20 4 Such a "statement [positing
legitimacy upon the people] is regarded as no mere flourish. It is accepted
which tends to assimilate the framework of the Community Treaties with a State's "con-
stitution" for the purposes of dynamic evolution. The implications of this perspective
are far-reaching. The Court sides with the understanding of the Member States as "mas-
ters of the Treaties" and claims the role of final arbiter as to the scope of and compe-
tences covered by the parliamentary assent to the Maastricht Treaty." Id.
198. See Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area [ECJ], 269.
199. See Frank Vibert, Europe's Constitutional Deficit, in EUROPE'S CONSTITnTONAL
FuTURE (James M. Buchanan et al., eds.) 69, 87-88 (1990).
200. See LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 107-08 (William Connolly ed., 1984).
201. MAX WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 130-131 (A.M.
Henderson & Talcot Parsons eds. & trans., 1947).
202. See Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why it Matters, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. 1165, 1206 (1997). According to Professor Summers, "Without such a 'set' meth-
odology and operational techniques, and without the established mandatory and exclu-
sionary force of legally authoritative reasons for action that this methodology and these
techniques generate, there could be no social objects of sufficient determinateness and
constancy through time to which the people of a society could express or imply their
assent, acceptance, or acquiescence-the primary sources of legitimacy in modern sys-
tems. And without such legitimacy, the levels of voluntary compliance in accord with
the formal reasons for action that law generates could not be sustained." Id.
203. DAVID McKAY, DESIGNING EUROPE: COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL EXPE-
RIENCE 150 (2001).
204. Werner von Simson, Was Heipt in Einer Europdischen Verfassung ,,Das Volk"? 26
EUROPARECHT, 1, 1 (1991).
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as law."20 5 "The people, or constituent assembly acting on their behalf,
has authority to enact a Constitution."20 6 This is exactly the manner in
which the U.S. Constitution premises its authority. 20 7 Constitutions
derive their authority in a manner philosophically similar to the theoretical
establishment of the social contract: the "people" agree to a particular bind-
ing higher law.20 8 In modern society, we generally hold that a democracy
is legitimate only if "the people" consent to being governed, and "the peo-
ple" continue to direct the government albeit often in a representative
form. 20 9
The U.S. Constitution formally derives its legitimacy from "the peo-
ple."2 10 Similarly, the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) posits its legiti-
macy on the "German people."2 11 Additionally, the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man states: "The source of all sovereignty resides essentially
in the nation ('the people', 1793 version); nor can any individual or any
body of men be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived
from it."2 12
The source of legitimacy for the EU Treaties comes not from "the peo-
ple" but from the Member States themselves according to separate constitu-
tional provisions.2 13 While the concept of European citizenship has
become embedded as a fundamental element of European law, the concept
is derived not from a higher law.2 14 Instead, the intergovernmental cooper-
ation of Member States established European citizenship in Part Two, Arti-
cle 8 of the amended European Economic Treaty. 2 15 Title I, Article A of the
Treaty on European Union contains the provision: "This Treaty marks a
new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peo-
ples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the
citizen."2 16 Hence, the authority for European law does not flow from "the
205. WHEARx, supra note 57, at 55.
206. Id. at 54-55.
207. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
208. See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIOALISM: PHILO-
SOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 30-32 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
209. See WEILER, supra note 4.
210. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
211. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] pmbl. (F.R.G.).
212. DAvID BEarEHAm & CmHusOPHE LORD, LEaGrmAcY AND T-E EUROPEAN UNON 7
(1998).
213. See Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 Eu LJ. 282, 290 (1995).
214. See Annette Schrauwen, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in European Citizen-
ship, 23 FopanmAm 1r'L LJ. 778 (2000). According to Annette Schrauwen, "European
citizenship is built on the principle of free economic movement and is definitely not the
expression of belonging to a political or a social community." Id. at 793-794.
215. See EC Treaty (The Treaty on European Union formally changed the name of the
Community from the "European Economic Community" to "European Community";
hence the term EC Treaty or simply EC will be used henceforth to refer to the former
EEC Treaty after the ratification of the TEU). Part Two, Article 8, Section 1 reads: "Citi-
zenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union." Section 2 continues: "Citizens of the
Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties
imposed thereby." Id. art. 8, §§ 1, 2.
216. TEU tit. I, art. A.
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people" (from bottom to top) but from the top downwards, finding its legit-
imacy in a system imposed by the Member States. 2 17
D. The Precarious Nature of the Doctrine of Supremacy of European
Law and the Bundesverfassungsgericht
The three cases heard by the German Supreme Court discussed in Section
II probably best illustrate the conflict between Member State sovereignty
and the doctrine of supremacy of European law. Owing to contrasting
legal interpretations, the Bundesverfassungsgericht2 18 and the ECJ have
been at odds over the precise basis of the doctrine of supremacy. 2 19 While
the ECJ has assumed since Costa2 20 that the doctrine of supremacy is "an
inherent feature of Community law," the Bundesverfassungsgericht has held
that Germany only grants European law supremacy in certain fields
through Articles 23 and 24 of the Grundgesetz.22 1 This indicates that in
German eyes, primacy remains with German law.2 22 Moreover, while Arti-
cle 24 originally provided the mechanism for Germany's accession to the
Communities, Article 25 defined the relationship between German law and
EC law.2 23 However, this Article provided simply for international law to
enjoy primacy over ordinary law; it did not address the issue of constitu-
tional law. Thus, with no established convention on this uncertainty, it
has been left to the Bundesverfassungsgericht to resolve the issue, and the
German Constitutional Court has consistently upheld the primacy of Ger-
man law.2 24 The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not accept the doctrine of
supremacy for some time, and even when accepted, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court reserved the right to withdraw its support for the supremacy
of EC law should it find the basic rights in the Grundgesetz no longer ade-
quately protected under EC law.22 5
E. The European Court of Justice, Supremacy, and Germany: A Review
Since 1964, European law has in principle enjoyed supremacy over
217. See Grimm, supra note 213, at 290-291.
218. For an account of the Bundesfassungsgericht's authority vis-A-vis the Grundgesetz,
see Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NoTRE D mE L. REv. 504
(1987).
219. See Peter M. Huber, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europaischer Gerichtshof als
Hater der Gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kompetenzordnung, 116 ARCHly DES O'arNTLICHEN
RECHTS 210, 216-217 (1991).
220. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (1964).
221. Roth, supra note 181, at 142.
222. See Hilf, supra note 61. Meinhard Hilf argues "es sind die Mitgliedstaaten, die
das Integratiosprogramm festlegen"; (it is the Member States that determine the integra-
tion program.). Id. at 10.
223. Article 25 reads: "Die allgemeinen Regeln des V61kerrechtes sind Bestandteil des
Bundesrechtes. Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten unmit-
telbar fir die Bewohner des Bundesgebietes." GRUNDGSErZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 25
(F.R G.).
224. See Grimm, supra note 213.
225. Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wnsche Handelsgesellschaft, 3
C.M.L.R. 225 (BVerfGE 1987) (F.R.G.).
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national law.22 6 The German Federal Supreme Court however has never
unequivocally recognized the primacy of European law,2 27 holding instead
that the Grundgesetz is the supreme authority of law in Germany.2 28
Despite the clarification that Wainsche Handelsgesellschaft and later Solange
III provided to Germany's position on the supremacy of European law,
there remains a lack of clear demarcation between German domestic juris-
diction and ECJ authority. 22 9 Specifically, it is unclear where the compe-
tences of the Bundesverfassungsgericht end and those of the European
Court of Justice begin.230 Therefore, European legal integration will
remain a two-step process between Germany and the Court, since it
requires agreement by both actors to achieve progress.2 3 1 Despite the
ambiguity concerning the limits of European and German jurisdictions,
one certainty remains: despite a decision of the ECJ, the Federal Republic
of Germany retains the authority to reject Community law if the European
Court goes beyond its granted competence. 2 32 Article 23 of the German
Constitution grants a greater legitimacy to the Communities since transfers
of sovereignty must have the approval of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and
the Lander.2 33 However, the Grundgesetz remains the supreme legal
authority23 4 for the Federal Republic of Germany.
According to Professor Grimm, "Since the Solange I ruling, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court has never deviated from its view that the
supremacy of Community law in Germany is conditioned on an adequate
protection of fundamental rights on the Community level."235 Professor
Bruno de Witte comments, "It would be a misconception to see all this as
creating a specifically German obstacle on the road to European integra-
tion."23 6 Given this prevailing mood, it is hard to imagine absolute
supremacy being accorded to EC law. "The unrestricted primacy of Com-
munity law within the domestic legal systems of the Member States would
signify nothing less than the birth of federal statehood at the European
level."23 7 The European Union is ill-prepared for this task. The EU's over-
all inter-governmental structure "might deal a mild blow to a school of
thought which tends to assimilate the framework of the Community Trea-
ties with a State's 'constitution."' 238 Clearly, the Communities lack the
authority of a state, which ultimately means that the Court must balance
its decisions to the political reality of holding a narrow institutional
226. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (1964).
227. See Herdegen, supra note 151.
228. Huber, supra note 219, at 216-217.
229. See Meinhard Hilf, The Application of Rules of National Administrative Law in the
Implementation of Community Law, 3 Y.B. Eut- L. 79 (1983).
230. See Huber, supra note 219, at 217.
231. See Herdegen, supra note 151, at 239.
232. See MAmAs HERDEGEN, EUROPAICHT 163 (1997).
233. See Sommermann, supra note 155, at 601.
234. Huber, supra note 219, at 227.
235. Grimm, supra note 80, at 231.
236. De Witte, supra note 185, at 300.
237. Herdegen, supra note 151, at 240.
238. Id. at 236.
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authority.239
F. The State of European Law
Given the prior discussion on constitutionalism, the problems inherent in
neoconstitutionalism may be summarized as follows:
[V]iewed as a constitution the Treaty is gravely defective. There is no enu-
meration of the rights and prerogatives of member-states, or attempt in even
general terms to incorporate such principles as 'subsidiary' which might aim
to demarcate responsibilities. There is no attempt to provide for checks and
balances between executive, legislative and judicial functions of the type
which would be regarded as essential for the constitution of a modern
state.... They lay the basis for activist interpretations of the Treaty provi-
sions rather than judicial limits.
The democratic rights and civil liberties of individuals are mentioned only
in passing. The Treaty is showing its age: its framers were more concerned
with providing a supranational platform for benevolent bureaucrats than a
framework and processes for the exercise of political choice by the citizens
of member-states. 240
As the conclusions of this Note indicate, the Treaties do not form a
constitution for the European Communities. While the lack of a constitu-
tion in itself certainly does not prevent the ECJ from playing a fundamental
role in European economic and even political matters, it nonetheless per-
manently restricts the competences of the Communities. 241 Despite the
tendency of academics to refer to the constitutionalization of the Treaties,
these documents remain less than a true constitution given that the Com-
munity's authority flows from an external source.242 What is fundamen-
tally important to recognize is that to assume that the Treaties form a
constitution is to disregard the potential political and legal deficiencies fac-
ing the European Communities. 243 Such oversimplification of political
and legal realities contributes to the already complex and undemocratic
reputation which the Communities have gained.244 Given the significant
impact these issues have upon the legitimacy of the European Court of
Justice, it is in the interest of European integration to address these issues
prudently and objectively.
G. Adopting a Constitution for the Union
The issue of constitutionalism is necessarily wed to the ultimate political
destination of the Communities. It is beyond the scope of this Note to
speculate on the ultimate form the Communities might take since that is a
political decision collectively determined by the separate Member States;
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however, without the necessary legal structure, the Communities are
restricted in the manner in which they might evolve. 245 Severe problems
lie in adhering to the existing Treaties for building such a state:
The assumption that political integration in Europe can continue to be pur-
sued through indirect methods is a false one. It insults the instincts and
intelligence of the peoples of Europe. It provokes a myriad of ill-defined and
contradictory fears. It stimulates irrational opposition. It aggravates the ten-
sions between the ties of the old political order that are under challenge and
the ties of the new order of political association which have yet to be firmly
established.2 46
Despite any amount of constitutionalizing, the Treaties remain a crea-
ture unlike any traditional national constitution.2 4 7 Although conceived
from international law,24 8 the Communities undoubtedly consist of an
unprecedented institutional network that blurs the apparent authority of
the Member States, having progressed beyond the realm of a traditional
international organization. 249 A significant transfer of sovereignty would
require substantiation by the citizens.250 At the moment, the Communities
derive their power from the separate Member States who receive their
respective authority from constitutions (written or unwritten as the case
may be) which base their legitimacy upon their respective citizens.25 ' In
this manner, the respective national governments receive their legitimacy
from popular support of the citizens. 25 2 Professor Grimm explains this
matter:
[I]t is inherent in a constitution in the full sense of the term that it goes back
to an act taken by or at least attributed to the people.... There is no such
source for primary Community law. It goes back not to a European people
but to the individual Member States, and remains dependent upon them
even after its entry into force. While nations give themselves a constitution,
the European Union is given a constitution by third parties. It consequently
does not have the disposal of its own constitution. The 'Master of the Trea-
ties'.. . are still the Member States, who have not been, as it were, absorbed
into the Union.2 53
Moreover, identification remains with the nation-state and not at the
European level, a complete European administration simply does not
work.2 54 Although a number of scholars have urged the adoption of a
European Constitution,2 55 German Foreign MinisterJoschka Fischer's con-
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stitutional proposals in January 1999 at the European Parliament in Stras-
bourg25 6 and in May 2000, at Humboldt Universitaet in Berlin,25 7 and
French President Jacques Chirac's calls for a European Constitution a
month later at the German Bundestag served to ignite a popular political
debate.2 58 By engaging in a European-wide debate and subsequent adop-
tion of a formal constitution, the Union could lay to rest the concerns over
its legitimacy.
Conclusion
The notion that the Treaties are called upon to exercise this constitutional
role is rife with theoretical problems, not the least of which is the derivative
nature of the ECJ's authority. Without significant safeguards for its author-
ity, the Court's continued legitimacy remains contingent upon respect
from the Member States. Failure to recognize the limits of the Treaties pro-
vides no solution; rather, it further complicates an already complicated
legal structure by prolonging, delaying and concealing-but not alleviat-
ing-conflicts between national and Community law. Noting these funda-
mental theoretical problems, these issues should be evaluated frankly and
thoroughly, especially given that many experts simply "gloss over this. '2 59
Ultimately, the legitimacy of the ECJ and even the long-term viability of the
Communities is connected to these constitutional issues. To this end, the
concerns expressed by politicians, scholars and citizens throughout
Europe should serve as the momentum for the drafting of a formal Euro-
pean Constitution. Although a formidable task, the result would clearly
protect both the competences of the EU and the Member States. Failure to
adopt a formal Constitution will instead perpetuate a undemocratic and
outdated system of governance.
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